Thammasat University students interested in ASEAN studies, Malaysia, political science, sociology, and related subjects may find it useful to participate in a free 29 April Zoom webinar on Whither Institutional Reform in Malaysia?
The event, on Monday, 29 April 2024 at 9am Bangkok time, is presented by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.
The TU Library collection includes several books about institutional reform in Malaysia.
The word whither in the title of the presentation is a literayr term in English meaning where or in what direction something is going.
As explained on the event website,
About the Webinar
When Anwar Ibrahim formed the Malaysian government in November 2022, popular expectations of reforms were far more muted than when Pakatan Harapan (PH) first won in 2018. After over a year, Anwar’s cobbled-together ‘Unity’ government has yet to articulate a comprehensive, agreed-upon platform or clear priorities, let alone achieve substantial reforms. The common ground undergirding the coalition Anwar heads is less about ideological compatibility than a shared interest in holding power. Yet, the component coalitions’ and parties’ election manifestos converged to a surprising extent in policy terms. Thus, an agreed-upon post-election platform that lays out targets for which to hold this government accountable in 2027 could be feasible.
However, even PH’s usually loyal followers are growing restless, due to the lack of progress on institutional reforms and indications even of a right-wing turn. This frustration is as Anwar’s administration seeks to pre-empt or counter a purported Islamist ‘green wave’, namely, the threat from the opposition Perikatan Nasional. The electoral-reform coalition Bersih, for instance, has moved from issuing reminders about promised reforms—from separation of the roles of public prosecutor and attorney general to passage of a political finance law—to a February 2024 march and talk of returning the masses to the streets, as in Barisan Nasional days. Human rights groups, the Malaysian Bar, and others have decried a lack of progress or lost ground on civil liberties and other structural reforms.
This webinar will review reforms Anwar’s government has achieved thus far and what seems likely yet to materialise; how processes of reform now compare with past approaches; and what accounts for how little has been, or seems likely to be, achieved.
About the Speaker
Dr. Meredith Weiss is Professor of Political Science in the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy at the University at Albany, State University of New York, the United States of America.
The TU Library collection includes several examples of published research by Professor Weiss.
Students are invited to register at this link:
https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/8717116123941/WN_C0xUcHQbQpawUtAlcWWjhQ#/registration
In an interview with The Diplomat from 2019, Professor Weiss observed:
Unfortunately, Malaysia has yet to introduce exit polls at elections, so answers to questions of how any given voters voted, or what issues really tipped the scales are necessarily more speculative than they might be elsewhere.
That said, surveys leading up to polling day, various expert analyses, and my own impressions from observing the campaign suggest frustration with corruption, former prime minister Najib Razak, and the BN’s governance — an intermeshed syndrome of issues — drove the result. Those grievances or preferences led some voters to support Pakatan Harapan and others to support Parti Islam seMalaysia (PAS), depending on the specific candidates standing, proactive (rather than just reactive) priorities, the local strength and record of the parties, and voters’ own ethnoreligious and regional identities.
Importantly, much of the vote for Pakatan (and surely PAS), though, was reactive: a vote against Najib and his BN coalition rather than for an alternative vision. And particularly those Malay voters whose support Mahathir and his communal Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia successfully wooed may well have been voting for a return to the UMNO of Mahathir’s day — an order centered around Malay privileges and state-spurred developmentalism — in a climate of rising costs of living and too-excessive rent-seeking, not for a new model of noncommunal or otherwise really differently pitched governance. […]
PH has made real progress in certain priority areas and is pushing ahead in others, but surely will not fulfill all the promises in its election manifesto. Indeed, that document seems to have slipped into semi-obscurity of late.
The PH government made immediate headway in restructuring its anticorruption efforts in particular. Given Mahathir’s impetus to jump back into politics, and the extent to which 1MDB and other fiascos (FELDA Global Ventures, for instance) loomed over the election, that priority is hardly surprising. PH immediately fulfilled an election promise to repeal the goods and services tax (GST), too, albeit replacing it with a sales and services tax (SST), introduced some moderately more consultative mechanisms, and demonstrated greater forbearance toward social protest and criticism.
Broader institutional restructuring is proceeding, but driven primarily by reformist individuals. Parliamentary reform, for instance, to introduce select committees, revivify debate, and otherwise improve the legislative process has made some headway, pressed more importantly by the Speaker of the lower house, the Dewan Rakyat, Tan Sri Mohamad Ariff Md. Yusof, than by elected political leadership. Minister of Housing and Local Government Zuraidah Kamaruddin has championed reintroduction of local-council elections, notwithstanding her government’s continuing reticence. And the chief of the Election Commission (EC), Datuk Azhar Azizan (a.k.a. Art Harun), has revised nomination-day and polling processes within his immediate purview while the Electoral Reform Committee continues with its investigations.
Complete overhaul of the electoral system may be unlikely, and the immediate redistricting to redress malapportionment and gerrymandering would require constitutional amendment. Nevertheless, beyond the EC’s procedural tweaks, parliament has reached — surprisingly — bipartisan agreement to lower the voting age from 21 to 18, and a new law on political finance seems imminent. A bill to establish an Independent Police Complaints of Misconduct Commission is likewise working its way through the parliamentary process now, after years of false starts; it is now charting new policymaking ground in being referred to the Special Select Committee for Consideration of Bills for further deliberation (though again, on the Speaker’s initiative).
In terms of fair metrics to assess progress: The one that matters most will surely be the somewhat epiphenomenal one, of whether economic growth proceeds, particularly at the level of household income and opportunities. And for Malay 2018 protest voters in particular, especially if the developing PAS–UMNO alliance holds: These institutional reforms may matter less than whether Malay voters feel their rights and privileges adequately protected — a metric that may be significantly interchangeable with an assessment of household economic status. At least some proportion of voters will tally up PH’s progress against its 2018 manifesto promises, but even if those voters wish for greater headway toward enhanced civil liberties, less communal structures and priorities, or other goals, they are unlikely to see a more progressive alternative. […]
(All images courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)