Thammasat University students interested in ASEAN studies, Indonesia, political science, foreign policy, and related subjects may find it useful to participate in a free 23 July Zoom webinar on As the Dust Settles After the Elections: New Nuances in the Twin Axes of Indonesian Politics.

The event, on Tuesday, 23 July 2024 at 9am Bangkok time, is presented by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.

The TU Library collection includes several books about different aspects of Indonesian politics.

Students are welcome to register for the event at this link:

https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/4017193804402/WN_NCj6qkEWTQSSf_ZizZBOow#/registration

As explained on the event website,

Two axes of tension were revealed in 2023 during the lead-up to Indonesia’s presidential election campaign. The first relates to the political dynamics of personal ambition within the political establishment; the second relates to a dilemma faced by civil society in its relation to the political establishment. Neither the election campaign nor the actual election results have altered the dominant role of these two tensions. However, new nuances have been introduced.

A new three-way tension has emerged within the political establishment as separate trajectories of ambition surface among president-elect Prabowo Subianto, the outgoing president Joko Widodo and his family, and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), led by Megawati Sukarnoputri.

The attempt by the new Workers’ Party (Partai Buruh, PB) to emerge as a representative of some of the civil society constituency has failed, with the PB scoring a low vote. Furthermore, the tensions between those who see the PB as the kernel of an ideologically social democratic opposition force and those who see it as an alliance with elements in the political establishment have sharpened. Meanwhile, civil society organisations outside the PB have sustained their activity post-election. This seminar aims to elucidate the intersection between civil society and the mainstream forces outside of Prabowo’s coalition.

About the Speaker

Dr. Maxwell Lane is a Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. He has worked as a journalist, a researcher in the Australian Parliament, a human rights activist, a lecturer, and teacher. His latest books are Indonesia Out of Exile: How Pramoedya’s Buru Quartet Killed a Dictatorship (Penguin 2023) and Saudara Berdiri di Pihak Yang Mana? Politik Seni Subversif Rendra (Djaman Baroe 2024). He is also the translator of several works by Pramoedya Ananta Toer and W.S. Rendra. Dr Lane frequently guest lectures at Gadjah Mada University and other universities in Indonesia.

TU students may access books by Dr. Lane through the TU Library Interlibrary Loan (ILL) service.

Earlier this month, Dr. Lane wrote an article posted on Fulcrum, published by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute: Indonesia’s Labour Party After the Elections: Ambiguities Continue.

The article begins:

The failure of Indonesia’s working-class representatives to secure a toehold in the national legislature is partly explained by their inability to make up their mind on whether to be a true oppositional force.

The successful registration of the Workers Party (Partai Buruh, PB) for Indonesia’s 2024 parliamentary (DPR) elections attracted considerable attention among commentators and especially among Indonesia’s civil society community. Until 2024, almost all the parties in parliament could trace their origins back to the New Order period. There was additional interest in the PB phenomena because it projected itself as not only representing workers but also the full spectrum of the poor and activist civil society.  Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, the non-representation of organised civil society, including unionised workers and other sectors, has been a feature of mainstream electoral politics.

The PB’s vote in the 2024 elections was much lower than what was hinted as possible by a party spokesperson who claimed a constituency of 10 million. With just 972,910 votes, or 0.64 per cent of the national vote, the PB did not reach the 4 per cent threshold to win any DPR seats. It did, however, win 11 seats in some local parliaments. PB activists told the author that most of these were in West Papua, where PB’s popularity was based on the profile of its leader from an earlier period, the late Mochtar Pakpahan, a Christian social democrat who had supported self-determination for West Papua. Other local seats were won in Lampung, Ambon and two in Bekasi.

The most basic explanation for this simply relates to the paltry resources available to the PB compared to all the existing parties. These parties, each with support concentrated in different geographical areas, had long been embedded in local business and elite family networks, often intertwined with religious and social organisations, for decades.

Also important was that PB’s election campaign featured two controversies that revealed fundamental contradictions and a resultant deep political ambiguity, which blunted any potential for presenting PB as an alternative to the elite parties in any inspiring manner.

First, the PB was unable to take a clear stand towards the three presidential candidates. The PB stated it could support none of the candidates because they all supported the government’s Job Creation Law, which was opposed by all unions because of its weakening of union rights. However, PB leaders reserved the right to change their policy if there was a run-off (which did not take place as Prabowo Subianto swept the first round). This stance gave the impression that the PB was leaving the door open to negotiations with an elite figure. PB’s head, who also leads the Indonesian Trade Union Confederation (KSPI), Said Iqbal, had supported Prabowo in the two previous elections.

More crucial was PB’s deafening silence on the most controversial issues of interest to exactly the civil society constituency it claimed to represent. PB campaigned against the Job Creation Law and for a “welfare state” with better social welfare provisions and wages, amongst other things. However, the most significant issues among the civil society constituency were President Joko Widodo’s use of his incumbency to facilitate his ambitions for a family political dynasty, the use of cash payments and basic goods for the poor (bansos) as leverage to intimidate people, and Prabowo’s impunity from prosecution regarding his alleged past human rights violations. The PB, while it may have mentioned these issues in passing in an occasional press conference, did not campaign seriously on them. Thus, PB’s potential for differentiation from the existing parties was low. The campaign on a “welfare state” was also insufficient as a basis for differentiation, as all presidential candidates advocated social improvements. Prabowo, for example, promised free school lunches for children and the building of three million new cheap houses – significant incentives for Indonesia’s huge working precariat.

(All images courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)