Thammasat University students interested in American studies, political science, diplomacy, sociology, and related subjects may find it useful to participate in a free 18 July Zoom webinar on Thai-US Relations in 2024.
The event, on Thursday, 18 July 2024 at 9am Bangkok time, is organized by the Thailand Studies Programme of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.
The event announcement explains:
About the Webinar
In 2024, the relationship between Thailand and the United States can be described as edgy amity. Economically, they enjoy close trade and investment relations, with the US being Thailand’s primary export destination. Their defense diplomacy remains strong, involving US military aid, education, and joint exercises. Historically, during the Cold War, Thailand and the US were staunch allies, with Thailand aligning with any prevailing foreign powers in Southeast Asia reflecting its “Bend with Wind” policy. Post-2001, Thailand adopted a hedging policy, balancing its relations between the US and China to support royalist-nationalism. The coups of 2006 and 2014 further solidified this hedging approach. From 2019-2023, General Prayuth Chanocha government was more pro-US compared to the current Srettha Thavisin administration. Thailand and the US have differing views on Myanmar, and various Thai bureaucracies maintain different stances towards the US. In 2024, the US is no longer Thailand’s top economic partner but remains its leading security partner, with China emerging as a significant contender.
In this webinar, Dr. Chambers argues that Thai-US relations will continue to be a function of hedging if only because China has become a major partner for Thailand, but Thailand values a US partnership because of the US market and because Thailand needs the United States to ensure that China does not dominate Thailand altogether.
About the Speaker
Dr. Paul Chambers is a lecturer and advisor for International Affairs at the Center of ASEAN Community Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Naresuan University, Phitsanulok, Thailand. […]
The TU Library collection includes several books about different aspects of interactions between Thailand and the United States of America.
Students are invited to register at this link for the event:
https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/6817200769785/WN__l_cR8XTSjukyy3kSVPKxw#/registration
In May, Thai-US Relations: Amity With Some Caveats, an article by Dr. Chambers was posted on the website of Fulcrum, published by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
The Latin term caveat means let him beware. A caveat is a statement that limits a more general statement, as well as a warning to think before taking action. A common Latin phrase is caveat emptor or let the buyer beware.
The article begins:
The US has sought to maintain its traditional line towards Thailand, emphasising democracy and human rights. But geopolitical considerations are changing Washington’s calculus.
When a civilian, elected government was formed in Thailand in late August 2023 and approved by an appointed Senate, the Biden administration voiced its formal “congratulations”. The advent of the new coalition formally led by Premier Srettha Thavisin-led coalition (informally dominated by ex-Premier Thaksin Shinawatra) offered Washington a potentially more stable, albeit semi-elected regime.
This was a significant change, especially given the multiple Thai governments after the 2006 coup, mass protests, direct interference by the military, and subtle intervention by the palace. During this period, Thailand had increasingly tilted toward China. Thus, the 2023 accession of a civilian-led government was a breath of fresh air in Washington. But in May 2024, what is abundantly clear is that Thai policy toward the US, though perhaps more civilian-derived, is a function of realist hedging. This started in 2007, the year that Thailand and China had their inaugural military exercise, and marked Bangkok’ attempt to balance the United States against China to boost state security. Essentially, Bangkok is leveraging on both sides to maximise geopolitical benefits.
For many decades. Thailand and the US had one of the closest defence and economic relationships. Determined by the post-1947 Cold War, anti-Communism, free markets and Thailand’s policy of “bending with the wind,” this linkage remained generally firm until the end of the Cold War in 1991.
Thereupon, American policymakers prioritised democracy and human rights, which led Washington to strongly oppose Thailand’s 2006 and 2014 coups. The US suspended most military assistance, reduced the number of joint military exercises and paused any major new agreements until an elected government returned to office.
However, the rise of China, specifically after 2013 when Xi Jinping took power, affected Thai-US relations. Now, as one senior US diplomat told this author, Washington needs to balance its promotion of democratic norms with the need to retain its geopolitical interests. But Washington’s distancing of Thailand and China’s charm offensive towards the kingdom contributed to Thailand increasingly turning to China for military aid, joint military exercises and military education for Thai soldiers.
Under US President Donald Trump, Washington suspended Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) trade preferences for Thailand in retaliation for Bangkok’s banning imports of US pesticides and pork). In the field of security, however, the US attempted to tilt “hedging” Thailand back from China: Washington’s sanctioning of Thailand diminished and US-Thai relations improved. The thaw was reflected in US weapons sales: 140 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicles replaced China’s VN-1s. When Joe Biden succeeded Trump in 2021, he maintained Trump’s policy of prioritising geopolitical interests over democratic values.
In 2022, Bangkok and Washington signed the US-Thailand Communique on Strategic Alliance and Partnership. In 2023, with Thailand investing over US$10 billion in the US, two US congressmen established the US-Thai Alliance Caucus.
In late February 2024, representatives of Thailand and the US met for the 2nd Thailand-U.S. Strategic and Defense Dialogue (2+2), where Washington committed to providing a grant for the Thai military’s modernisation and professionalisation. Meanwhile, despite refusing Thailand’s request for advanced F-35 fighter aircraft, the Royal Thai Air Force Commander is now looking to Washington for new F-16 fighter jets. In March, Srettha met with US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimundo, telling her that Thailand aimed to make the US the leading investor in Thailand. In 2023, China was the top investor in Thailand, with Singapore in second place and the US in third, though in early 2024 Japan was the leader.
Washington has long worried that Thailand might draw too close to Beijing. China is currently Thailand’s leading import partner compared to the US, which ranks fourth. Washington is Bangkok’s top export destination (China is second).
On another front, Thailand has worked ever closely with Chinese police, even tabling a controversial proposal to get Chinese officers to operate in Thailand. Furthermore, though Srettha advertised building a “land bridge” across a part of southern Thailand to compete with the commercial traffic moving through the Straits of Malacca, the Biden administration sees this project as more useful to China, potentially propelling Thailand closer to Beijing. […]
(All images courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)