Thammasat University students interested in ASEAN studies, Myanmar, history, political science, war studies, and related subjects may find it useful to participate in a free 11 September Zoom webinar on Operation 1027 Second Phase in Myanmar: What’s New, What’s Next?

The event, on Wednesday, 11 September 2024 at 9am Bangkok time, is presented by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.

Operation 1027 is an ongoing military offensive conducted by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, a military coalition composed of three ethnic armed organisations in Myanmar: the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), allied with other rebel forces in the country, against the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s ruling military junta.

The surprise offensive’s series of victories against the military regime have led observers to call it “by far the most difficult moment” for the regime “since the early days of the coup.” The regime has been unable to effectively respond to the wave of losses it has suffered, resorting to indiscriminate shelling and airstrikes to retaliate.

The sides agreed to a ceasefire in December, but the agreement quickly collapsed. The sides agreed to another China-brokered ceasefire for northern Shan State on January 11, but following skirmishes and allegations that the regime had conducted airstrikes in violation of the ceasefire’s terms, the ceasefire broke down in June as rebel forces resumed offensive actions.

The TU Library collection includes some books about different aspects of events in post-coup Myanmar.

Students are welcome to register for the event at this link:

https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/3617249038155/WN_aOR2HEgORNiG40zsv2-CjQ#/registration

The event website explains:

About the Webinar

Please join the Myanmar Studies Programme at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute for a conversation with analysts and experts on the aftermath of the second phase of Operation 1027 in late June 2024 in Myanmar’s northern Shan State. The discussion will consider the implications for the ongoing conflict in Myanmar in the context of Naypyidaw’s receding administrative reach in several parts of the country, China’s conception of its interests in Myanmar, the aspirations, alliances, and actions of various resistance forces and ethnic armed organisations in Myanmar, and the feasibility of the State Administration Council regime’s stated aim to convene elections.

About the Speakers

Amara Thiha is a doctoral researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). He has over eight years of experience in peace and security dialogue, ceasefire and conflict management, and foreign policy/public diplomacy matters related to Myanmar. Amara was involved in the negotiations for the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement through its signing. His past research affiliations include the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security and the Stimson Center.

Yun Sun is a Senior Fellow, Co-Director of the East Asia Program, and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. She leads the Stimson Center’s Myanmar project. […]

Kyaw Yin Hlaing (Discussant) is a Visiting Senior Fellow in the Myanmar Studies Programme at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute and a visiting scholar in Cornell University’s Southeast Asia Program. […] He is currently researching what has gone wrong with Myanmar’s democratic transition.

An article, Operation 1027: Changing the tides of the Myanmar civil war?,  was posted earlier this year on the website of he Brookings Institution, a nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C., that conducts in-depth, nonpartisan research to improve policy and governance at local, national, and global levels.

It begins:

The third anniversary of the February 2021 coup d’état in Myanmar is quickly approaching. For the past three years, the people of Myanmar have faced intense and widespread violence, civil unrest, and a crumbling economy under the rule of the military junta and its State Administration Council (SAC). The government in exile — the National Unity Government (NUG) — has led and partnered with local resistance forces inside Myanmar, including the People’s Defense Force (PDF) and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), to battle against the SAC. Despite the junta’s repeated, brutal counterinsurgency operations against civilians, by 2022, many observers assessed that the armed conflict had stalled.

However, by the end of 2023, the stalemate appeared to be upended. In late October, three anti-junta EAOs significantly pushed back the Burmese military in the country’s northern areas. Some Myanmar watchers believe that the balance of power may shift sufficiently to change the tides within the country or the military government, even if it is premature to predict the collapse of the SAC.

Operation 1027

On October 27, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BTA), composed of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army and numbering some 15,000 fighters, launched Operation 1027, an anti-SAC offensive in Shan State. The offensive captured significant territory bordering China. The 3BTA had been preparing for this offensive for years, according to local interlocutors, and its forces were equipped with advanced weapons, including drones acquired on foreign markets. The 3BTA has had diverse funding sources, including donations, assistance from other ethnic organizations, trade and tax revenues from territories under its control, as well as alleged illicit activities.

Although the three organizations assert their goal is the “overthrowing of the military dictatorship,” most analysts see their primary goal as local territorial gains, especially capturing Kokang from the local government supported by the SAC. Their success in resource-rich northern Shan has delivered a military and economic blow to the junta, but it remains to be seen whether it is significant enough to break the regime’s grip on power.

Nonetheless, Operation 1027 stimulated unprecedented coordination and unity among the resistance forces. Synchronized collective campaigns targeting the military government emerged across the country, and the military’s control has been shaken, its resources strained, and the morale of its soldiers undermined, leading to more defections.

These dynamics have strengthened the willingness of the disparate and highly fractious EAOs and resistance groups to cooperate more extensively to increase their strategic leverage. Even outright rivals are exhibiting an inclination toward unity, at least temporarily. For example, on November 29, two ethnic Shan militias — the Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State Army and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army — agreed to a truce and future unification after a trust-building period.

The Burmese military’s power has been diminished throughout the years. By the early 2000s, it was estimated that the military had grown to about 400,000 service personnel. By May 2023, the United States Institute of Peace estimated the size of the military had fallen by more than half to around 150,000 personnel, including 70,000 combat soldiers. Casualties and defections have affected the military significantly, although it still monopolizes airpower as well as heavy artillery. The military has deployed both with no regard for civilian casualties.

Fearful of the resistance’s attacks in lower Myanmar, especially in the heartland of the Bamar territory, the Burmese military has prioritized air strikes against the EAOs. Highly indiscriminate and augmenting civilian suffering, they cause damage to the EAOs but are insufficient to help the junta reestablish territorial control in the north. The junta still enjoys revenues from domestic sources and foreign trade. Between the Feb 2021 coup and May 2023, it had imported more than $1 billion worth of weapons, according to a United Nations investigation. […]

(All images courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)