Thammasat University students interested in China studies, history, political science, economics, sociology, and related subjects may find it useful to participate in a free 22 August Zoom webinar on China’s Belt & Road Initiative: “Small but Beautiful?”

The event, on Tuesday, 22 August 2023 at 1pm Bangkok time, is presented by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.

The TU Library collection includes several books about different aspects of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Students are invited to register at this link:

https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_nHh1nWYHRQa4gWMyjZU9cw#/registration

The event webpage explains:

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Southeast Asian countries were significant beneficiaries of China’s FDI under the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). The pandemic has stalled China’s investment and BRI projects globally. With this year’s reopening, China’s BRI investment flows into Southeast Asia are expected to recover. The much-awaited return of Chinese investments to the region is being met with great expectations but also some concerns. The concerns relate to the potential impacts of BRI on the host countries’ environment and debt levels. In recent years, the Chinese government has tried to address the shortcomings of the initial BRI projects and at the same time promote green development projects, such as renewable energy, technology and electric vehicles.

This webinar will consider these issues and provide an overview of the progress and challenges facing China’s BRI projects in three Southeast Asian countries, namely Cambodia, Malaysia, and Indonesia. It will examine recent changes and future prospects of BRI projects in these countries and beyond, in light of a slowing Chinese economy.

About the Speakers

Brian Lee is an economist at Maybank Securities’ research team covering Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore, and overall ASEAN macro thematics research. […]

Jayant Menon joined the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute as Senior Fellow to continue his work on trade and development in the Asian region, following his early retirement from the ADB in 2020. […] The TU Library collection includes research published by Dr. Menon.

Tham Siew Yean is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore and Professor Emeritus, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. […]

Siwage Dharma Negara is a Senior Fellow and Co-Coordinator of the Indonesia Studies Programme at the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute. […]

An article posted in 2021 on the website of the Council on Foreign Relations explains:

By most accounts, the Belt and Road Initiative was introduced to advance “connectivity” between China and its neighbors, and via its neighbors with places further afield, primarily through traditional infrastructure like roads and railways, seaports and airports, bridges and tunnels, and pipelines and canals. Underlying the concept was the promotion of economic growth, whereby investment in transportation would lead to increases in trade, tourism, and other income-generating activity for all involved. China’s own meteoric economic growth over previous decades, partly the result of having done domestically what it aimed to do abroad, added credibility to its idea that BRI would spark growth in other countries.

Analysts were quick to point out, however, that a lot of infrastructure is “dual use;” that it might have military as well as commercial uses. China’s denial of such intentions, particularly vis-à-vis Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port and more recently Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, have not quieted foreign states’ concerns about the potential dual use of BRI projects. To the contrary, they have led to increased challenges on geopolitical grounds, whereby China is seen as extending not only its patronage abroad but its presence in strategically sensitive areas as well. The case of Hambantota, of which China took possession in 2017 after Sri Lanka failed in its loan obligations, gave rise to accusations of the BRI’s “debt trap diplomacy.” While this idea that China’s BRI projects trap recipient countries in debt has been challenged by researchers at a wide range of institutions, it is still a dominant narrative in Washington and elsewhere.

Moreover, at least as early as 2015, when it established the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) forum, China has broadened BRI projects beyond physical infrastructure. The LMC’s earliest public statements expressly placed its very founding, meetings, agreements, and initiatives under the rubric of the BRI. This in turn has brought to the fore questions concerning Chinese influence, in addition to its more concrete economic, security, or geopolitical interests.

Beijing doubled down on broadening BRI beyond physical infrastructure, introducing in 2016 a “Digital Silk Road” (DSR) in addition to the original BRI. This Digital Silk Road would promote fifth generation (5G) mobile internet capacity, particularly in countries behind or lacking in such critical twenty-first century technology, as well as other new technologies including smart cities, fintech systems, and others. At the same time, the inception of the DSR raised fears that it could enable the mining and utilization of data belonging or relating to foreign citizens, and that China would export its cybersecurity laws and other internet controls to foreign countries. […]

The BRI’s evolution, and the ambiguity of the overall project, are critical to understanding how BRI operates in Thailand. To a greater degree than in most other Southeast Asian countries, the BRI’s evolution and ambiguity are reflective of the project’s relationship with Thailand and with Thai civil society. This paper presents five main points concerning the ways in which Thai civil society has both challenged and been challenged by the BRI, resulting in a kind of split verdict as to the initiative’s present and future standing in the kingdom.

First is that civil society in Thailand cannot interact with what it cannot identify. There is no single understanding of the BRI in Thailand and certainly no prevailing narrative concerning the BRI’s nature, purpose, and effects. This is symbolized by confusion as to when Thailand officially became a participating country and as to which projects count as part of BRI.

Thais agree that the high-speed rail project, running from the Thai-Lao border to Bangkok and continuing south to its border with Malaysia, is a BRI project—in no small part because the rail actually starts in China and ends in Singapore. Yet on the one hand, the Thai section was agreed in concept and principle as far back as 2010, three years before the BRI was announced; on the other hand, Thailand did not appear on most BRI maps for several years after that 2013 announcement. And for a brief temporary period in 2016, Thai Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha actually canceled the project.

Furthermore, the rail line is one of the few projects in the kingdom that Beijing and Bangkok agree is actually part of the BRI. A list from inside China in early 2019 contained seven BRI projects in Thailand, although most had not been notably publicized as part of the initiative, and several hardly publicized at all. Conversely, the high-profile Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) and the rail network linking Bangkok’s two airports with U-Tapao Airport, were not listed. Nor was a potential canal across Thailand’s southern isthmus, despite press reports in Thailand going back to 2017 that it was being discussed as a possible BRI project.

Of course, a project need not be considered part of the BRI for Thai civil society to promote or oppose it, or to seek more information or provide its points of view. But given the various conceptions of the BRI discussed above, as well as its close association with a larger but equally complex and contested “Brand China,” it stands to reason that the BRI label makes a difference in how Thai civil society views a project.

Whether this ambiguity concerning projects’ BRI status is intentional or incidental is related to a second main point: Thai policymakers and business partners cannot help but be influenced by the approach of their Chinese counterparts, and China’s approach simply does not include an express role for civil society. While protests and petitions in China concerning infrastructure projects, particularly at a local level, are far more numerous than is generally reported, neither China’s various levels of government nor its state-backed banks and business are encouraged—much less required—to consult or consider views on the ground.

(All images courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)