Thammasat University students interested in ASEAN studies, Cambodia, Vietnam, political science, history, diplomacy, international relations, and related subjects may find it useful to participate in a free 20 November Zoom webinar on Cambodia’s Foreign Policy under Prime Minister Hun Manet and Implications for Vietnam.

The event, on Wednesday, 20 November 2024 at 9am Bangkok time, is presented by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.

The TU Library collection includes some books about different aspects of Cambodian foreign policy.

Students are welcome to register for the event at this link:

https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/3817300863755/WN_dgLAX1-oQ9m3eVLhO1MNJA#/registration

The event website explains:

About the Webinar

Since Hun Manet assumed the position of Cambodia’s prime minister in August 2023, several developments have sparked speculation about the country’s foreign policy direction and its ties with Vietnam under his leadership. These include the controversial decision to proceed with the construction of the Funan Techo Canal in August 2024 and the subsequent abrupt withdrawal from the Cambodia – Laos – Vietnam Development Triangle Area in the following month.

In light of these critical events, this webinar aims to provide insight into Cambodia’s foreign policy towards Vietnam under Prime Minister Hun Manet. The discussion will delve into the country’s domestic political landscape and the influence of historical memories as key factors shaping Cambodia’s approach to Vietnam. Additionally, the session will offer an assessment of the future of Cambodia-Vietnam relations over the next decade, particularly in the context of broader regional geostrategic shifts.

About the Speaker

Po Sovinda is the Designated Director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at the Institute for International Studies and Public Policy in the Royal University of Phnom Penh. […]

Last month, The Diplomat reported:

Revived Cambodian Nationalism Threatens to Undermine ‘Special’ Relationship With Vietnam

Anti-Vietnamese resentment has spelled an end to a cross-border cooperation agreement with Vietnam and Laos.

Cambodia’s recent withdrawal from Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area (CLV-DTA), a cross-border development cooperation scheme with Laos and Vietnam, is a cause for concern. The four northeastern Cambodian provinces affected are among the poorest regions in the whole of Southeast Asia. In general, the development of peripheral regions anywhere in the world is problematic if there are no significant cross-border value chains and trade relations.

It is therefore understandable that Ratanakkiri, Mondulkiri, Kratie, and Stung Treng provinces require special economic policy initiatives in order keep pace with the rest of Cambodia. The Cambodian government’s decision to withdraw from the CLV-DTA in September, after weeks of public protests against it, will certainly be to these provinces’ disadvantage.

It didn’t have to come to this. Any government that has to make unpopular decisions can face criticism and rejection by a majority or vocal minority of the population. Capable governments are then in a position to explain their decisions. They can do this in a rational way, for example by demonstrating the prospective cost-benefit advantages of a project, but they also need to account for emotion and public sentiment.

In Cambodian society, views of Vietnam are characterized by fervent dislike based on the memory of Vietnamese expansion in recent centuries as well as fears of loss and economic disadvantage. And precisely because it is more emotionally than rationally founded, no other political issue in Cambodia harbors greater potential for outrage than its relationship with Vietnam.

In Cambodia, this situation is aggravated by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)’s lack of understanding of public persuasion. This is because, in the regime’s logic, members of parliament and government officials are accountable not to the people, but to the country’s top leadership.

The protest against the CLV-DTA began on July 23 when four activists in Siem Reap critically discussed the cooperation agreement in a live video online. Later that day, they were arrested by the police.

In the weeks following, the government was either unwilling or unable to publicly explain the benefits of cross-border cooperation with Laos and Vietnam. There were neither government statements in the National Assembly followed by a broad debate, nor attempts to convince people at the grassroots level of the agreement’s benefits.

Instead, the government cracked down hard on those protesting the agreement; it has arrested more than 90 protesters since July, only later to reverse course and do exactly what those protesters were calling for: to withdraw from the agreement. I doubt whether there is a sophisticated strategy behind this concession to popular anger, which will certainly not improve perceptions of Cambodia’s reliability as a foreign partner.

Cambodia’s case shows once again the great advantages that arise from the processes of liberal democracies. After all, only those who fear losing power through being voted out of office will spend time and energy publicly promoting their positions and decisions. By contrast, autocratic regimes are lulled into a false sense of security that they can spare themselves this effort. Accordingly, the handling of the protests against the CLV-DTA is evidence of overburdening and overreaction, both in the decision to crack down and the decision to pull out of the agreement. […]

Certainly, there is little likelihood that this overdue debate about Cambodian nationhood and identity can be conducted openly. In the current political dispensation, the impetus for such a discussion can probably only come from the regime itself. In the past, Hun Sen has missed several opportunities.

While in 2003 he allowed an angry mob to storm and pillage the Thai embassy, first conjuring up and then recognizing the dangers of stirring up nationalist sentiment, he took a much more cautious approach in the later border conflict. The armed clashes that took place in 2010 and 2011 led to a wave of patriotism in Cambodia that had not been seen for decades, but which quickly died down again afterwards.

The potential of other domestic and foreign policy successes in recent years – e.g. the border agreement with Vietnam, the largely successful management during the COVID-19 pandemic, and, most recently, the organization of the Southeast Asian Games – also remained untapped. Similarly, King Norodom Sihamoni’s attempts to fill this void as the personified symbol of national unity and community are rather seldom.

Hence, Cambodian nationalism will likely continue to feed on rejection and segregation. The destructive danger behind this should by no means be underestimated by the regime, as the associated challenges could eventually pose threats to its hold on power.

Hun Sen has at least proven in the past that, unlike many populist autocrats around the world, he is not willing to play on xenophobic resentment. However, this is hardly surprising given that the Vietnamese were his major ally for three decades.

Times have since changed, and China has long since become Cambodia’s most important partner. As a result, Cambodia has become increasingly self-confident in its dealings with Vietnam, as demonstrated by the start of construction of the Funan Techo Canal in August and the termination of the CLV-DTA the following month. The CPP government’s reversion to old forms of anti-Vietnamese politics, however gradual, will likely pose further challenges to the bilateral relationship in the years to come.

(All images courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)