Thammasat University students interested in ASEAN studies, American studies, political science, history, diplomacy, international relations, and related subjects may find it useful to participate in a free 28 November Zoom webinar on The Prospects for US-Southeast Asia Relations under Trump 2.0.
The event, on Thursday, 28 November 2024 at 8:30am Bangkok time, is presented by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.
The TU Library collection includes some books about different aspects of United States-ASEAN foreign policy.
Students are welcome to register for the event at this link:
https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/6017316556082/WN_Q5C4rqIgSIK5sYKFXyk99Q#/registration
The event website explains:
Donald Trump has won a decisive victory at the US presidential election and his return raises fresh questions about the future of US engagement and leadership in Southeast Asia. His first tenure was characterised by limited engagement with the region — few bilateral meetings with Southeast Asian leaders, minimal attention to ASEAN, and a general absence from key regional forums. Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) further signalled US retreat from multilateral trade agreements in Asia. However, his record was not entirely negative. Despite Trump’s protectionist rhetoric, the region largely avoided the brunt of his economic policies and maintained trade surpluses with America. Trump’s administration also reinforced bilateral defense arrangements in the region under its own Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. Now, as Trump returns for a second term with a stronger mandate to implement his America First agenda, Southeast Asia stands at a crossroads. This hybrid seminar explores the potential implications of a Trump 2.0 administration for Southeast Asia’s economic and geopolitical landscape – focusing on Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam.
About the Speakers
Dr. Evan A. Laksmana is Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia Military Modernisation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and editor of the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment, an annual strategic dossier launched as part of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. […]
Mr. Julio S. Amador III is Interim President of the Foundation for the National Interest, Founder and Trustee of the non-profit FACTS Asia. […]
Mr. Bilahari Kausikan spent his entire career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore (MFA). […]
Ambassador Pham Quang Vinh worked in Vietnam’s foreign service for over 38 years (1980-2018). […]
Earlier this year, an article posted on the website of the Council on Foreign Relations noted:
What a Second Trump Term Could Mean for Southeast Asia
His aggressive stance toward China could force many in the region to pick a side.
As relations between the United States and China have chilled and bilateral tensions have risen in the past four years over issues ranging from control of advanced semiconductors to Beijing’s support for Moscow, Southeast Asian states have played a delicate game.
With the exception of the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who essentially has taken sides with the United States despite any blowback from China, other major Southeast Asian countries have attempted to maintain their traditional approach of hedging between the two great powers.
So, while Vietnam signed a deal with the Biden administration upgrading the U.S.-Vietnam relationship, it immediately pivoted by hosting Chinese leader Xi Jinping and upgrading the China-Vietnam relationship too. Similarly, while Indonesia’s Prabowo Subianto oversaw increasing security links to the United States as defense minister in the second Joko Widodo administration; he made his first overseas trip to China as president-elect.
But the days of playing it both ways may come to an end, if GOP nominee Donald Trump wins a second term in the U.S. presidential election this November. A second Trump administration could raise tensions between the United States and-China to the point where even Southeast Asian countries, long skilled at balancing, may find it difficult to avoid taking sides. Trump is currently tied with or just trailing President Joe Biden in most national polls, but Trump has maintained a lead in most of the pivotal “swing states” for months.
A second Trump administration is unlikely to focus much on Southeast Asia itself. In his first term, Trump did forge personal bonds with some Southeast Asian leaders, like former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte. In general, though, Trump placed a relatively low priority on the region. In addition, his nationalist approach to trade—one that represented a broad range of Americans who have turned against trade—was in sharp contrast with the economic integration occurring across East Asia. In this vacuum, major powers like Japan and China led instead. Trump has given many speeches in the 2023-2024 campaign season, and talked a lot about China. He has made few, if any, mentions of a future approach to Southeast Asia.
Trump has made bold promises about U.S. China policy—promises that, if enacted, would transform the world. It is wrong to dismiss some of these promises as just campaign bluster. As Jamelle Bouie of The New York Times has shown, historically, most presidential candidates, once elected, have actually tried to put into practice most of the major promises they made on the campaign trail.
Trump has pledged to institute major protectionist measures regarding trade with China. While generally proposing a new U.S. tariff of ten percent on imports from any country, he has suggested slapping even higher and higher tariffs on China. He also has said that he will significantly increase efforts to pressure and incentivize multinationals to close their operations in China.
These actions alone could cause intense blowback from Beijing and have major impacts on the world economy. One senior China specialist with close ties to Trump dismissed these concerns, simply noting that China was not a market economy under Xi Jinping and dismissed any broader worries about tough U.S. economic action.
At the same time, the Trump campaign has relied on advice from some of the biggest China hawks. Many of these experts want to wind down U.S. support for allies in Europe and focus U.S. defense more heavily on Asia, particularly on ramping up defenses of Taiwan and more openly embracing the island.
And while Trump did not follow through on all of his pledges to punish China during his time in the White House, he was more aggressive than prior presidents to demonize Beijing and cast the bilateral relationship as one of outright competition. (Rising anger at China is, to be fair, now an increasingly bipartisan viewpoint in the United States.)
But in his first term, Trump’s failure to fully follow through came in part because he stumbled into office. He did not, according to many reports, expect to win the 2016 election, and took time to impose his views on the government and find advisors who would carry them out.
This time around, Trump-affiliated organizations and think tanks have already created a sizable personnel roster who could step in immediately in a second term and would loyally carry out Trump’s foreign policy wishes. They also have drafted clear and lengthy policy papers on a range of domestic and international issues, including China.
These two changes—a clear plan for a second Trump administration and a coterie of loyalists ready to start from day one—will likely make Trump much more effective at achieving his goals in his second term, including his very hardline stance on China.
Unlike most U.S. presidents in the past few decades, who understood the diverse interests of many nations in Asia, Trump has often been infuriated by countries that try to maintain close ties with both the United States and China. Nowhere is this anger more likely to appear than in his views of Southeast Asia, since other parts of the region, like Northeast Asia, Australia, and even India, contain powers that also are increasingly skeptical of China’s economic and military actions. […]
(All images courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)