TU STUDENTS INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN FREE 16 APRIL ZOOM WEBINAR ON MYANMAR’S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND CHINA

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Thammasat University students interested in ASEAN studies, Myanmar, Russia, China, political science, sociology, international relations, diplomacy, and related subjects may find it useful to participate in a free 16 April Zoom webinar on Myanmar’s Relations with Russia and China: Convenience or Co-optation?

The event, on Tuesday, 16 April at 8am Bangkok time, is presented by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.

The TU Library collection includes research about different aspects of international relations between Myanmar, Russia, and China.

Students are invited to register at this link:

https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/9117119584120/WN_AN9F7JvNRk2MZcX_N8PKMA#/registration

The event webpage explains:

About the Webinar

When the Myanmar military seized power in February 2021, Russia and China were not among the voices expressing concern about the military coup. China referred to the takeover as “major cabinet reshuffle”, but remained pragmatic (and cautious) in its approach to engaging with the State Administration Council (SAC) regime, especially towards the SAC leader. Russia visibly lent its support, mainly via defence and military-to-military ties and echoed the Myanmar military’s rhetoric. The SAC has made much of Moscow’s support, while relations with Beijing seem to have deteriorated after Operation 1027 in northern Shan State in late October 2023. The change in Myanmar’s conflict dynamics after Operation 1027, and the rise of cybercrime in Myanmar have affected China’s attitude and interests towards the ongoing Myanmar crisis.

ISEAS Myanmar Studies Programme invites two expert analysts of Russia’s and China’s relations with Myanmar to provide their assessment on the outlook for the political-security and economic implications of Naypyidaw’s relations with Moscow and Beijing.

About the Speakers

Dr Ian Storey is Senior Fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, and co-editor of an ISEAS flagship journal Contemporary Southeast Asia. […]

Yun Sun is a Senior Fellow, Co-Director of the East Asia Program, and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. […]

The TU Library collection includes published research by Dr. Storey.

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Last year Dr. Storey published a report, available for free download on the ISEAS website, Myanmar-Russia Relations Since the Coup: An Ever Tighter Embrace.

Its executive summary follows:

  • Myanmar-Russia relations have strengthened considerably since Moscow acknowledged the Tatmadaw’s seizure of power on 1 February 2021, and the junta endorsed the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.
  • Coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing views Russia as the ruling State Administration Council’s (SAC) preferred major power partner.
  • Russia is now Myanmar’s largest source of military assistance. The Tatmadaw relies heavily on Russian-made aircraft to suppress anti-SAC forces.
  • Myanmar is the only Southeast Asian country to transfer military supplies to the Russian armed forces for use in occupied areas of Ukraine.
  • Naypyidaw seeks cooperation with Moscow to resolve the country’s energy crisis by importing Russian oil and partnering with Russian energy companies to exploit the country’s hydrocarbon reserves and develop renewable energy sources including wind, hydro and nuclear.
  • The SAC wants Russia to provide Myanmar with nuclear power by transferring small modular reactors. Naypyidaw’s atomic power ambitions have renewed fears that the junta seeks to acquire nuclear weapons, despite the absence of solid evidence.
  • While China remains Myanmar’s most important source of trade and investment, the SAC and the Kremlin have agreed to boost commerce and tourism.

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On the ThinkChina website in 2022, Dr. Storey coauthored an article, Ukraine war: Southeast Asian responses and why the conflict matters to the region:

Southeast Asia’s initial responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine varied considerably, with Singapore taking the strongest stance and Myanmar supporting the Kremlin’s actions. As the conflict intensified, regional responses strengthened somewhat: eight ASEAN members voted for a United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Moscow’s invasion; Vietnam and Laos, Russia’s two closest partners in the region, abstained. The Russia-Ukraine war is likely to have varying degrees of economic, political and security impacts on the region. A key concern is if China takes a leaf from Russia’s playbook in terms of using manufactured histories and grey zone/hybrid warfare tactics, and disregarding international law. […]

Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia

The responses from these five ASEAN members were relatively muted.

Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob said he was “saddened” by events in Ukraine. His office later issued a statement of “serious concern”, but instead of singling Russia out as the aggressor, urged “all concerned parties” to de-escalate the conflict.

As with Malaysia, Thailand expressed “deep concern” and its support for a peaceful resolution of the conflict through dialogue. Thailand generally has cordial relations with Russia, and tries to avoid taking sides in great power politics. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha said that Thailand would remain “neutral” in the conflict.

Vietnam has abstained from any criticism of President Putin’s actions because Russia is its most important defence partner. Over the past two decades, Vietnam has relied on Russian-manufactured weapons to modernise its armed forces to serve as a deterrent against China in the South China Sea. Keen not to offend Moscow, Vietnam stated that it was “deeply concerned” by the conflict and that the “relevant parties” should “exercise restraint”, respect international law and seek a peaceful resolution through dialogue.

As with Vietnam, Laos sought to protect its long-standing friendship with Russia by avoiding criticism of Moscow. At the outbreak of hostilities, the Lao foreign ministry did not even express concern, only that it was closely following the “evolving, complex and sensitive” situation in Ukraine and that “all parties concerned” should “exercise utmost restraint”, de-escalate tensions and pursue a peaceful settlement through diplomatic measures.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s response has been the weakest among these countries, expressing only his hope for a “peaceful solution” to the conflict. As with neighbouring Thailand, Hun Sen said Cambodia would remain “neutral” in the dispute.

Myanmar

Myanmar is the only country in Southeast Asia to support Russia’s actions. Following the military coup in February 2021, Russia was the first major power to recognise the junta as the legitimate government of Myanmar. Keen to return the diplomatic favour, a spokesman for the military said Russia was acting to protect its own sovereignty and demonstrating its great power status.

Both Moscow and the coup leaders are keen to strengthen relations, especially through more acquisitions of Russian arms, though the junta has admitted that financial sanctions imposed on Russia could complicate the procurement process. In contrast to the junta’s support for the Kremlin, Myanmar’s government in exile, the National Unity Government, condemned the invasion. […]

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(All images courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)